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ABSTRACT 
Undue payment is one of the numerous legal institutions created by the eminent Roman legal 
advisers, who, by exquisitely developing the legal technique and practice would create that 
certain tool which would valorize the subjective rights in regard to reestablishing the 
equilibrium and the equivalence which the parties of a legal obligation report owe to one 
another, within an uncorrupted legal circuit; these institutions would later prove their 
viability and permanence across centuries, being reconfigured according to the new factors 
which configure law in the modern and contemporary age within the continental system of 
law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The principle of equity which would later become one of the postulates of Roman law, was 
expressed in the phrase used by Celsus according to which, Jus estarsboni et aequi,1 is 
suggestively shown in the legal construction named “undue payment”, an institution seen by 
the Roman lawmakers as of one the forms of manifestation of quasi contracts, in regard to the 
effects it causes. 
Although quasi contracts were known as distinctive sources of civil obligations, in Roman 
doctrine they were seen as those licit legal acts which would produce legal effects similar to 
those which reside in contracts2. Thus, in regard to the form, there are some differences 
between contracts and quasi contracts, while in regard to the legal effects they cause, there are 
certain similarities which lead to perfect symmetry. 
Undue payment aims to terminate an obligation; in reality it expresses the licit legal deed seen 
as a distinctive source of obligation. The mechanism of this legal operation resides in the fact 
that a person performs a payment by error, which was in fact not owed to the person known as 
accipiens. 
In a subsequent age, Pomponious would rephrase the principle of equity and equivalence of 
performances in the light of natural law by showing that “according to natural law it is 
equitable that no one would unjustly enrich by causing damage to another person3. 
According to the principle of equity, the person who made an undue payment had the right to 
demand the restitution of payment, namely the repeat of the undue performance4, an issue 
which, a few centuries later, would be expressed under the direct influence of Roman law, in 
the regulation of article 1092 first alignment of the 1864 Civil Code, which stated that “any 
payment entails a debt; that which was paid without being owed is subject to repetition in 
                                                          
1E.Molcuț, D.Oancea, Roman law, Sansa Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993, page 6 
2Ibidem, page 309 
3 D.50.17.20.6 
4A.E.Gittard, R.Villers, Droit romain et ancient droit francais. Les obligations, Paris, 1976, page 295 
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regard to the conditions in which it was performed, as well as in regard to the effects which it 
produces; all these would later be regulated in article 992-998 of the old Civil Code. In the 
light of the new Civil Code according to article 1470 “any payment entails a valid debt; if the 
payment occurred in the lack of a valid legal obligation, the person who pays without owing 
would be entitled to restitution” (see article 1341, first alignment). 
Even if the term for payment, by its semantics, indicates that providing an amount of money 
of transferring property, would synthetically be expressed in the modern age, by showing that 
by payment “latosensu”, we mean the execution in nature of an obligation whose object can 
be different, starting from providing an amount of money or performing any other activity 
(see article 1469 second alignment of the new Civil Code). 
In order for a person to be held to perform a payment, a valid debt must exist; otherwise the 
payment is undue. 
The fundament of the legal nature of undue payment would be qualified by most roman 
practitioners as a practical application of unjust enrichment.  
This is partially true as in the opinion of Roman practitioners, starting from the fact that, in a 
particular approach in a specific case, if either an amount of money or any goods would be 
received without being owed, they are to be returned. When performing a systematic analysis, 
there are no essential differences between unjust enrichment and undue payment. 
However, the fact which made possible a certain connection between these two institutions in 
regard to the legal effects they cause was the postulate which would govern the system of 
“juscivilae” according to which good faith – ex bona fidae – must direct the conduct of civil 
law subjects within the civil circuit. 
A fortiori, in the old age, when merchandise exchange were rare, given the natural character 
of economy, the legal relations, especially the civil ones, were created between people who 
had complete confidence in one another; furthermore, the excessive formalism of legal acts 
derived from the will agreement of the parties and was subject to the this legal concept with 
strong moral characteristics. From the perspective of this historic-legal relation, specialty 
doctrine publicly stated the fact that - good faith - as a constant of law is practically presumed 
– boe fides praesumitur – when concluding any legal act. 
This postulate of Roman law was perpetuated until the modern and contemporary age, as 
under the influence of the law school built by the eminent Roman legal advisers of the classic 
and post classic age, where we find this principle of presumed good faith, rephrased under a 
modern form, a principle with strong socio-human implications. 
Thus, the 1804 Napoleon Civil Code expressly states this principle in article 2268 which 
stated that “La bonne foie et toujourspresumee”, a legal regulation also found in the 1864 
Civil Code which states in article 1899 second alignment that - “Good faith is always 
presumed” - while in the new Civil Code, the Roman concept is expressed in the following 
manner, in article 14 second alignment - “Good faith is presumed until proven otherwise”. 
This subjective conditions with strong moral significance is particularized in the contractual 
relations where it is directly applied in the matter of civil obligation thus “de plano” 
forbidding double payment for any performance derived from a contract, thus – Bona fides 
non partiturutbis idem exigatur. 
In the opinion of Roman legal advisers of the classical age, undue payment was a form of 
unjust enrichment5. This solution was based on the principle of equity which emphasized an 
ethic aspect and a legal interdiction according to which the deed of the person who would 
enrich at the expense of another person, which made possible the creation of a legal identity 
between undue payment and unjust enrichment. 
It is however obvious that, in case of transferring values form one patrimony to another, this 
is achieved without the consent of the person who is impoverished and without the guilt of the 
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enriched person6, as if we were in the presence of this situation, the general  provisions which 
govern the institution of tort civil liability would apply.  
The essential difference is that, in case of undue payment, an apparent legal relation is 
presumed to exist between solvens and accipiens, namely between two subjects of law, with 
an apparent “contractual relation”, one being the creditor and the other one the debtor. 
Solvens makes an erroneous payment, as in the first situation the payment was made to a 
creditor which does not in fact exist, but, in the end, the payment was made to a person other 
than the real creditor or, eventually an existing debt was paid by another person than the real 
debtor. 
In the above mentioned situation “at least one of the parties is the real creditor or the real 
debtor and the person who makes the payment, does so by error, as otherwise we would be in 
the presence of a valid legal relation”. 
In the current law, the two licit legal deeds seen as sources of obligations are sanctioned by 
distinctive actions; thus, in case of unjust enrichment the specific action – actio de in rem 
verso – is not identified with – condictio sine causa – namely the action on the repeat of the 
undue payment. 
In Roman law, undue payment is seen as a particular situation of unjust enrichment, 
sanctioned by a – condictio - which practically achieves a true action of repeat which, as a 
result of praetorians’ intervention, would later become the – condictio sine causa.  
In the old age, the condictions were those personal actions by which “restitution of an amount 
of money or other fungible goods or other determined objects was requested”7, thus the 
source of the obligation was a literal contract or a mutuum contract. 
Thus, Silia law introduces “condictiocertaepecuniae”, while Capurnia law 
“condictiotriticaria”. 
However, it was not possible to establish if the general line of evolution or Roman law 
between the old age condictions and –condictioincerti – which aimed the restitution of undue 
payment in the classical age, was a determination and influence relation; however the 
connecting element is the moral and legal fundament which entails the situation according to 
which someone is not allowed to enrich to the damage of another person. 
“Jurenaturaeaequmest, neminem cum alteriusdetrimento et juriafierilocupletiorem”8. 
For identical reasons, based on principles of factual symmetry, a continuity and evolution 
relation between “condictiocerti” of the classical age and the diverse forms of manifestation 
of the condictions of the post classical age can’t be established, with express reference to 
Justinian’s law – condictioindebiti, condictioabcausarumdatorum, 
condictioabturpemcausarum, condictioabiniustamcausamsicondictio sine causa9. 
This system, generically designed in the classical age by the expression– condictio sine causa 
– is subsequently completed in Justinian’s age under numerous forms of expression, 
according to their role and the area of application as shown above. However, we must 
mention that what was determined by condictio sine causa of the classical age is not identified 
in regard to the legal form with condictio sine causa as a special condiction of Justinian’s age. 
Regardless of the Roman age which we analyze and the form of condictions, these entail the 
restitution of an undue performances which resulted in the unjust enrichment of a party at the 
same time another party was impoverished, a deed which would likely create an imbalance 
between the subjects of law; this imbalance was to be repaired by solvens returning the undue 
payment whose object could be different in regard to the shape regulated by the activity 
finalized as a result of the systematization of law performed in Justinian’s age. 
                                                          
6Ibidem 
7I. Cătuneanu, Elementary course of Roman law, Cartea Românească Publishing House, Cluj, 1922, page 348 
8D. 50-17.20.6 
9I.Cătuneanu, op.cit., page 350 
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The common denominator of all these condictions is that according to which the performance 
was made by error – condictioindebiti – whether it was made by fulfilling a dishonorable deed 
by the person who received payment – condictioabturpemcausam – or by expecting a licit fact 
which did not occur  – condictiocausa data non secuta – or the performance resulted in the 
payment of interest above the legal limit or the performance would result in the restitution of 
amounts of money paid as down payment for concluding a contract which was no longer 
concluded – condictio sine causa. 
The task of providing evidence in order to obtain the restitution of performances would 
belong to the person who filed a complaint before the court, according to the following 
principle – eiincumbitprobatia qui dicet non qui negant10. 
In regard to the object of restitution, it would “return to the person who was entitled to own it, 
as modified when the good was unjustly taken from his patrimony, with all its accessories, 
fruits and so on11. In case the good was estranged, accipiens was held to return the usual price, 
as the fact that he sold someone else’s possession was considered, thus resulting in unjust 
enrichment. 
By commenting and interpreting the classical texts and by the systematic analysis of the 
Digests “Unjust enrichment which is to be returned means all that was left to the plaintiff to 
use as a result of the value which was transferred without cause”12. As a consequence 
“restitution was demanded, restitution of the good and the use which would have been the 
plaintiff’s”13, obviously in the situation in which he would have been of good faith. 
If the good faith accipiens would have proved that the good was destroyed as a result of an 
emergency situation, he would not be held to return the good, thus considering that the rules 
which apply are those which regulate the situation of the bad faith person who, by receiving a 
undue payment commits a crime, namely theft, and, as a consequence the rule “fur semper in 
mora” would apply.  Possession of such a stolen good can’t be achieved, as the conditions of 
useful possession were not met. Thus, it resulted in a particular situation of - condictioindebiti 
– sanctioned by condictiopossesionis, which emphasizes the case according to which the 
object of restitution can be simple possession. 
In the light of the above mentioned issues, we can conclude that all these condicitons were 
nothing more than forms meant to valorize subjective rights in the form of personal actions of 
abstract character, as is the material fact which was the basis of the plaintiff’s claim and 
which would result in unjust enrichment. 
The condictions would sanction those obligations derived from outside contractual relations 
which would connect the parties and regulate their legal conduct. 
The regulation of undue payment also has a prevention component by not allowing debtors to 
double pay, a sanction which was applied in case a debt was denied but later proved in court, 
thus the debtors would rather pay and then, by filing an condictioindebiti would request 
repetition of payment, a situation which was favorable to them in those historic times “as the 
person who makes the payment would indirectly deny that he owes what he paid, but would 
not risk a double conviction”14. 
Under the direct influence of Roman doctrine, there are similar present days opinions, 
sometimes even symmetrical opinions in contemporary judicial specialty doctrine, which 
converge toward the conclusion according to which undue payment is a form un unjust 
enrichment, but obviously the two licit deeds are always distinctive sources of obligations.  
Undue payment is different from unjust enrichment without basis in regard to extent of the 
restitution obligation, as in the second case bad faith accopiens is held to pay damages to 
solvens for the entire prejudice, as well as by the specific forms of valorizing, namely the 
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actions which are distinctive recteactio in re verso in case of unjust enrichment and the 
complaint for the restitution of undue payment15. 
In conclusion, under the new Civil Code, the lawmaker regulated the two distinctive 
categories, by qualifying them as licit judicial facts which are sources of civil obligations. 
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